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Over the past four years, congressional leaders have introduced
several complex bills in an effort to reauthorize the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980'
(CERCLA).2 These bills contain proposals that range in scope from
those that would restructure CERCLA to those that only would address
specific issues and concerns.3 This Article examines some of the current
proposals that would amend CERCLA to encourage the restoration and
redevelopment of "brownfields." The United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) defines brownfields as "abandoned, idled or
under used industrial and commercial sites where expansion or
* Associate Professor of Business Law, Indiana University at Bloomington School of
Business. B.A. 1970, J.D. 1976, University of Indiana. The author wishes to thank Charles de
Saillan, whose proposals in Superjfnd Reauthorization: A More Modest Proposal, 27 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) No. 5 (May 1997), served as the basis for several of the recommendations
expressed in this Article.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675(1994).
2. See Charles de Saillan, Superfund Reauthorization: A More Modest Proposal, 27 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) No. 5, at 10201 (May 1997) [hereinafter Superfund Reauthorization].
3. See id. at 10202.
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redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental
contamination that can add cost, time, or uncertainty to a redevelopment
project.' 4
Estimates of the number of brownfields vary, but one source has
suggested that there are as many as 650,000 brownfield sites throughout
the United States.5 Investors incur a cost of $250,000 to remedy an
average brownfield site.6 Encouraging remediation of these sites would
improve the environment and could save taxpayers a great deal of
money. At least one estimate suggests that $100 billion in taxes could
be generated and 100,000 new jobs could be created by the use of
abandoned brownfield sites. 7
In order to evaluate how current proposals to amend CERCLA
might affect brownfield remediation and restoration, Part II of this
Article reviews some key provisions of CERCLA. Part III then
discusses specific problems in brownfield remediation and the major
issues prompting proposed changes in CERCLA. The proposed changes
discussed in Part III include amendments to CERCLA's liability
scheme, increased administrative efforts to facilitate brownfield
development, redefined cleanup standards, revamped state cleanup
programs, and increased financial incentives to encourage brownfield
redevelopment. Part IV of this Article concludes that brownfield
remediation and restoration should be encouraged and that certain
sections of CERCLA should be amended to facilitate such activities;
however, the basic framework of CERCLA, including its liability
scheme, should remain intact.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF CERCLA
A. Response Actions
During the 1970s and early 1980s, the American public became
4. REGION 5 OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, EPA, BASIC BROWNFIELDS FACT SHEET (1996); see
also Brownfields Showcase Communities, 62 Fed. Reg. 44,274 (1997).
5. See Multiple Factors Should Shape Choice of Technologyfor Brownflelds, 27 Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 48, at 2489 (April 11, 1997).
6. See id
7. See Administration of Brownfields Program Questioned at Hill Appropriations Hearing,
27 Env't Rep. (BNA) No.49, at 2511 (April 18, 1997).
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increasingly alarmed by mounting reports of seriously contaminated,
abandoned hazardous waste sites throughout the nation! In 1980,
following the discovery of a bubbling swamp of toxic chemicals at
Love Canal, New York, Congress enacted CERCLA to remedy and
deter such environmental pollution.9 In enacting CERCLA, Congress
established a multibillion dollar fund (the "Superfund") to help finance
the cleanup of such sites.'0 CERCLA is generally administered by the
EPA; however, CERCLA does allow the EPA to enter into cooperative
agreements with states so that states may take the lead cleanup role in a
particular case.1
CERCLA authorizes the EPA to use Superfund monies to
implement two kinds of cleanup actions, or "response actions," at
Superfund sites.' 2 The first type of response action is a "removal
action." Removal actions are short-term cleanup measures. 13 Examples
of removal actions include the provision of temporary clean water
supplies, the removal of leaking drums from a site, the temporary
evacuation of a site's residents, and the provision of any other
emergency assistance that may be necessary at a given site.14 The
8. See id. at n.4. The frequency and prevalence of news stories throughout the late 1970s
and early 1980s helps to demonstrate the severity of mismanaged and uncontrolled hazardous
waste sites. See Superfund Reauthorization, supra note 2, at n.4; see also Andrew Blake,
Dumpers: they Drove By Night, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 22, 198 1, at 22; Michael H. Brown, Love
Canal, U.S.A., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1979, § 6 (Magazine), at 23; Donald Janson, Jersey Hunts
Dumpers of Toxics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1978, at Al; Donald G. McNeil Jr., Upstate Waste
Site May Endanger Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1978, at AI; Roger A. Rosenblatt, Toxic Flow
From Acid Pits Creates Water Basin Peril, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1984, at 1; Peggy Strain, Wells
Could be Tainted, Homes West ofArsenal Told, DENVER POST, Jan. 16, 1981, at 1.
9. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat 2767. CERCLA does not regulate the use of hazardous substances.
Rather, it provides a system for identifying and cleaning up hazardous substances that have been
released into the environment. In contrast, the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992
(1994), addresses recycling and disposal of hazardous substances. See generally id.
10. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 221, 94 Stat. 2801.
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(d)(I) (1994). Such agreements, however, are uncommon. See
Superound Reauthorization, supra note 2, at 10208.
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 9611. In implementing a response action, the EPA may either sue liable
parties to recover its response costs or compel liable parties to implement a cleanup. See id.
13. See Superfund Reauthorization, supra note 2, at 10206.
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23). Generally, CERCLA limits removal actions to a maximum of
twelve months and $2 million. See id. § 9604(cXl); see also Superfund Reauthorization, supra note
2, at 10206.
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second type of response action is a "remedial action." Remedial actions
are long-term response measures.' 5 These might include permanent
groundwater remediation at a site and permanent relocation of a site's
residents.' 6 The EPA establishes procedures and methods for selecting
and evaluating hazardous waste sites and for conducting cleanup actions
under the National Contingency Plan (NCP).17 Steps in the NCP
process include performing a preliminary assessment and site
inspection, conducting a remedial investigation and feasibility study,
publishing a proposed remediation plan, and issuing the Agency's
record of decision.
18
The National Priorities List (NPL) is part of the National
Contingency Plan. Using criteria based on "risks to public health,
welfare, or the environment" ' 19 the EPA evaluates and ranks sites
according to their contamination levels and then lists those rankings on
the NPL.20 For remedial actions to be financed by the Superfund, the
corresponding sites must be listed on the NPL. Listing on the NPL,
however, is not required for the funding of removal actions.2' Since the
establishment of the first NPL in September 1983, the number of listed
sites has grown from 406 sites to 1,238 sites.
22
B. Cleanup Standards
Congress established statutory requirements for cleanup standards at
Superfund sites in the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
of 1986 (SARA).23 Under section 121 of CERCLA,24 remedial actions
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24).
16. See Superiund Reauthorization, supra note 2, at 10206; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24).
17. The NCP pre-dates CERCLA. The NCP was first drafted pursuant to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994), to address the problem of oil
spills. See J. GORDON ARBUCKLE ET AL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 274 (12th ed. 1993)
[hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK]. The NCP, as originally enacted, set forth criteria
for disposing ofoil and other hazardous substances under the FWPCA. See id.
18. See Superfund Reauthorization, supra note 2, at 10206.
19. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 273.
20. See id.
21. Seeid.at274.
22. See Superfund Reauthorization, supra note 2, at 10207.
23. Superfiund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994)). Congress also increased available
cleanup funds when it passed SARA.
24. 42U.S.C§9621.
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must meet the requirements of the NCP and be cost effective. Section
121(b) gives preference to remedial actions involving treatment that
"permanently and significantly reduces the volume, toxicity or mobility
of hazardous substances." 26 The statute further specifies that off-site
disposal of hazardous substances without such treatment is the "least
favored alternative."
27
A major goal of SARA was "to establish a statutory bias toward the
implementation of permanent treatment technologies and permanent
solutions whenever they are feasible and achievable. ' 28 In furtherance
of this goal, section 12 1(d) of CERCLA now requires the EPA to select
remedial actions that attain cleanup to a degree that "assures protection
of human health and the environment" 29 CERCLA also requires the
EPA to review completed remedial actions once every five years at sites
where hazardous substances have been left in place.30
C. Natural Resource Damages
Most CERCLA actions involve costs for response actions at a
particular cleanup site. However, CERCLA also contains an important
provision permitting the government to recover an amount equal to the
estimated value of an area's natural resources.3' Under section
107(a)(4)(C), a responsible party may be liable for "damages for injury
to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable
costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss. ' '32 The government
has increasingly used this provision in CERCLA cases to recover the
25. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 279.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b).
27. Id. § 9621(bXl).
28. 132 CONG. REc. 23,438 (1986) (statement of Sen. Chafee). Senator Chafee believed that
SARA was "the only way to assure the successful completion of the cleanup effort." Id. Under
CERCLA, a remedy must achieve "all Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirements
(ARARs) [if] hazardous substances are left on-site." ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra
note 17, at 280. ARARs include all federal environmental laws and regulations, in addition to any
state standards that are more stringent than federal regulations. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 9621 (dX2XA)).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(dXl).
30. See id. §9621(c). The five-year requirement is a minimum standard. An EPA
administrator may choose to inspect a site as often as he or she deems necessary. See id.
31. See id. § 9607(aX4)(C).
32. Id; see also ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 306.
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lost value of natural resources.3
D. Liability under CERCLA
CERCLA imposes liability on four categories of "Potentially
Responsible Parties" (PRPs): (1) parties that generated or arranged for
the treatment or disposal of hazardous substances; (2) parties that
transported hazardous substances for treatment or disposal; (3) present
owners and operators of facilities at which substances have been
disposed; and (4) past owners and operators of facilities at which
hazardous substances have been disposed.34
PRPs are liable for response costs at a contaminated site. Response
costs may include those costs associated with either removal actions or
remedial actions.35 Liability under CERCLA is strict, joint and several,
and retroactive.36 CERCLA's imposition of strict liability on a PRP
means that a PRP may be liable under CERLCA regardless of whether
it deliberately or negligently caused environmental damage.37 Unless a
33. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 306. Retroactive liability is
limited under this provision. No damages can be recovered for releases that occurred before
December 11, 1980. See 42 U.S.C. § 9706(f).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); see also Superfund Reauthorization, supra note 2, at 10203.
35. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 295. Examples of potential
response costs include the costs of detecting, sampling, identifying, monitoring, and disposing of
hazardous substances. Such costs may also include applicable attorney's fees and consulting fees.
See id at 295-96. The EPA often hires attorneys and environmental consultants to ensure that
cleanup measures will comply with CERCLA. See id.
36. See Superfuimd Reauthorization, supra note 2, at 10203.
37. Strict liability for hazardous activities is not a new concept but is derived from an early
English common law case, Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 H. & C. 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex. 1865), rev'd,
1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (1866), affd, 3 L.L-E. & 1. App. 330 (H.L. 1868). In Rylands, the Exchequer
Chamber held that a "person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land and collects and keeps
there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril.' 1 L.Rt-Ex. 279. This rule
has been applied throughout the United States to activities such as the transportation of hazardous
substances, the spraying of hazardous substances, the emission of noxious gases, and the keeping of
explosives and flammables. See Superfind Reauthorization, supra note 2, at 10203 n.17 (citing S.
REP. No. 96-848, at 33 (1980)).
Courts have traditionally imposed strict liability when "the defendant's activity is unusual
and abnormal in the community, and the danger which it threatens to others is unduly
great...." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 75, at
537 (5th ed. 1984). In addition, courts will impose strict liability based on the fact that a
defendant has voluntarily and intentionally subjected others in his vicinity to a potentially
dangerous risk. See id.; see also NEPA to CERCLA: Completing The Circle, 7 Envtl. F. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) No. 6, at 11 (Nov./Dec. 1990). Philip T. Cummings, chief counsel of the Senate
Committee on Environmental and Public Works during the drafting of CERCLA and minority
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PRP can prove that the harm that it caused is divisible, it may be jointly
and severally liable for all of the cleanup costs at a site.38 Moreover,
because courts have held that CERCLA liability is retroactive 39 a court
may impose liability on a PRP for activities that preceded CERCLA's
enactment in 1980.40
E. Exemptions and Exclusions
There are few statutory defenses under CERCLA. Affirmative
defenses to liability include proof that the release of a hazardous
substance4' was caused solely by an act of God, an act of war, or an act
or omission of an independent third party other than an employee,
agent, or party with whom there was a contractual relationship (the
"third-party" defense).42 In the 1986 SARA amendments, Congress
narrowed its definition of "contractual relationship," thereby expanding
the third-party defense under CERCLA.43 For example, according to
Congress's new definition, a contractual relationship does not exist
between a purchaser and seller of contaminated property if after having
made all appropriate inquiries about the property, the purchaser was
counsel during the development of SARA, has written that "the core concepts of CERCLA are
the liability provisions, which adopt the common law principle of strict liability for the conduct
of abnormally dangerous activities." Id. According to the Second Restatement of Torts, in
determining strict liability, "It]he essential question is whether the risk created is so unusual,
either because of its magnitude or because of the circumstances surrounding it, as to justify the
imposition of strict liability for the harm that results from it, even though it is carried on with all
reasonable care." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(0 (1977).
38. See Superfund Reauthorization, supra note 2, at 10203. Section 113(0(2) of CERCLA
provides that a party can seek contribution from other liable or potentially liable parties who may
have contributed to the contamination of a site. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0. It is the responsibility of a
PRP, rather than the EPA, to collect contribution from other liable or potentially liable parties. See
Superjund Reauthorization, supra note 2, at 10203.
39. See Superfund Reauthorization, supra note 2, at 10204 (citing, inter alia, Nova Chems.
Inc. v. GAF Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Tenn. 1996) (upholding the constitutionality of
retroactive application of CERCLA)).
40. See Superfund Reauthorization, supra note 2, at 10203-04.
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14Xdefining the term "hazardous substance"). CERCLA
specifically excludes from its definition of hazardous substances any petroleum substances,
including various forms of natural gas. See id; see also Michael M. Gibson & David P. Young, Oil
aid Gas Exemptions Under RCRA and CERCLA: Are They Still "Safe Harbors" Eleven Years
Later?, 32 S. TEX. L. REv. 361 (1991).
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
43. See42 U.S.C. § 9601(35).
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unaware of the contamination at the time of purchase.
44
Another CERCLA exemption that has been the focus of litigation
involves the liability of secured creditors as "owners or operators."
Section 101(20)(A) of CERCLA expressly excludes from the term
"owner or operator" "a person, who, without participating in the
management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily
to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility. '45 This security
interest exemption is designed to protect lenders from liability if they
merely retain a security interest in contaminated property. In the past,
courts have construed this exemption narrowly; however, in 1997,
Congress clarified the exemption in response to lenders' concems.
46
Another issue that Congress addressed in SARA was the concern
that CERCLA liability could be imposed on parties that contributed
only minor amounts of hazardous substances to a site.47 Under the de
minimis settlement provisions in SARA, the EPA may enter into an
expedited settlement with a party that disposed of relatively small
amounts of hazardous substances at a site. The EPA then provides
such parties with a covenant not to sue, which amounts to immunity
from contribution suits.49 The law as amended also allows the EPA to
make "nonbinding preliminary allocations of responsibility" (NBARs)
for sites that involve multiple PRPs.50 CERCLA further allows the EPA
to enter into "mixed funding" agreements by which the government
assists liable parties in bearing the cost of a cleanup by granting the
liable parties a portion of Superfund money.
F. State Authority in CERCLA Cleanup Actions
Unlike other major federal environmental laws such as the Clean Air
44. See id.
45. Id § 9601(20)(A).
46. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 2502, 110
Stat. 3009,462-67.
47. See Superound Reauthorization, supra note 2, at 10205.
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g).
49. Seeki.
50. See id. § 9622(e)(3). In an NBAR, the EPA allocates among liable parties their
respective percentages of the total response cost. See id.
51. See SuperfundReauthorization, supra note 2, at 10205; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9622(b)(1),
(e)(3).
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Act S2 and the Clean Water Act,53 CERCLA does not establish a federal
and state partnership for its implementation and enforcement. Although
SARA gives states the authority to take the lead in response actions
under cooperative agreements with the EPA, such agreements are rare. 4
Regardless of whether a state assumes control of a cleanup, it may still
pay a significant percentage of the response costs that are funded by the
Superfund.
55
G. Concerns Underlying Proposals to "Fix" CERCLA
Many critics of CERCLA are convinced that CERCLA has been an
utter failure. Critics focus on the expense of the program and argue that,
after more than twelve years and $12 billion, only 220 of the currently
identified 1200 sites have been cleaned.56 Critics also argue that the
threat ofjoint and several liability under CERCLA encourages litigation
by, and between, PRPs, successor corporations, government agencies,
and insurers.57 They urge Congress to reform the law to permit parties
to negotiate a "fair-share payment" of the costs of cleanup at a site, to
streamline the cleanup process, and to provide more flexibility in setting
52. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q, 7410,7412(e) (1994).
53. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C §§ 1251-1387, 1315, 1316(c), 1318(c), 1319(a), 1326(c),
1329, 1342, 1344 (1994).
54. See Supefirnd Reauthorization, supra note 2, at 10208. The EPA has published
regulations governing cooperative agreements. See Cooperative Agreements and CERCLA State
Contracts for CERCLA Response Actions, 40 C.F.R. §§ 35.6000-.6820 (1996).
55. States must pay or assure payment of 10% of remedial action costs, with the state share
increasing to at least 50% fbr the cleanup of sites that were operated by a state or one of its political
subdivisions, either directly or through contract. The EPA may increase the state contribution
beyond 50% depending on the state's degree of responsibility for the release. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(cX3XC).
56. See Superfund Needs Reform to Speed Toxic Cleanup, U.SA. TODAY, Feb. 2, 1994, at
10A. According to one observer, the program is "absurdly expensive, hideously complex, and [
sometimes patently unfair. As a result, it invites litigation the way dung attracts flies; not by reeking,
but just by being." Id.
57. See Robert W. McGee, CERCLA: It's Time for Repeal After a Decade of Failure, 12
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 165 (1993). McGee argues that joint and several liability has
caused a litigation explosion, exacerbates harm to the environment, allocates the cost of cleanup
to the wrong parties, taxes producers rather than polluters, and harms the United States's ability
to compete abroad. See id. at 173-80; see also Lynda J. Oswald, New Directions in Joint and
Several Liability Under CERCLA?, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 299 (1995) (examining joint and
several liability under CERCLA).
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cleanup standards. 8
Supporters of CERCLA, on the other hand, note that CERCLA has
made considerable progress in cleaning up hazardous waste sites. 9 One
supporter of CERCLA, New Mexico Assistant Attorney General
Charles de Saillan, has noted that almost all NPL sites require some
form of groundwater remediation. 60 De Saillan has pointed out that this
kind of cleanup is an inherently lengthy process and necessarily takes
many years to complete. 6' Despite the fact that such cleanup is a slow
and difficult process, as of September 1996 groundwater remediation
had been completed at 410 NPL sites.62 Moreover, through September
1996, the EPA had conducted 4,023 removal actions: 1,226 at NPL sites
and 2,797 at non-NPL sites.63
In addition, supporters of CERCLA believe that any unfairness in
the CERCLA liability scheme is outweighed by CERCLA's benefits.
64
According to the EPA, liable parties now conduct seventy-two percent
of all remedial actions.65 In addition, potential liability provides a
powerful incentive for "voluntary cleanups" under state cleanup
programs. 66 The liability scheme also provides an incentive for industry
to manage its waste responsibly and to choose reliable transporters and
disposal facilities. 67 Supporters also disagree with CERCLA critics'
characterization of CERCLA's transaction costs as excessive. They
58. See, e.g., John C. Buckley, Reducing the Environmental Impact of CERCLA, 41 S.C.
L. REV. 765, 811 (1990) (presenting "a draft proposal for preventing ... needless consumption
while retaining the full positive force of CERCLA liability"); John M. Hyson, "Fairness" and
Joint and Several Liability in Government Cost Recovery Actions under CERCLA, 21 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 137 (1997) (examining joint and several liability under CERCLA, and noting
that courts should not be permitted to apportion liability based on a court's determination of
what constitutes a "fair" allocation of damages among PRPs).
59. See, e.g., Charles de Saillan, In Praise ofSuperfund, ENVIRONMENT, Oct. 1993, at 42.
60. See Superfund Reauthorization, supra note 2, at 10210. Complete groundwater
cleanup is an important step because only after such cleanup can operation and maintenance of
a site begin. See id. at 10211.
61. Seeidat10210-11.
62. Seeid. at 10211.
63. See id
64. See id.
65. See id (citing Superind Reauthorization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Superjind,
Recycling, and Solid Waste Management of the Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 103d
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point out that the numbers used by the critics are "front loaded" and
appear inaccurate because a disproportionately large share of
transaction costs are incurred early in the implementation of a CERCLA
remedy. 68 Supporters contend that CERCLA's transaction costs will
decrease as the number of remedial actions nearing completion
increases.69
Against the backdrop of this debate, Congress began its most recent
attempt to reauthorize CERCLA in 1993. 70 In 1994, the EPA sent a
proposed consensus bill to Congress, representing the Clinton
Administration's effort to develop a proposal that would be acceptable
to industry, states, municipalities, and environmental groups.71
Although CERCLA reauthorization was a top priority of the 104th
Congress,72 Congress was unable to pass comprehensive CERCLA
reform legislation 73 or extend the federal government's tax authority,
which would have been necessary to fund CERCLA reform.74
III. PROPOSALS TO AMEND CERCLA TO FACILITATE BROWNFIELD
REMEDIATION
Proposals to amend CERCLA to facilitate brownfield remediation
and redevelopment are important because these projects can have
significant benefits for the environment, urban residents, property
68. See id Many critics of CERCLA rely on a 1992 RAND study which concluded that, from
1986 to 1989, large industrial firms "spent an average of 21 percent of their CERCLA-related
expenditures on transaction costs." Id. (citing LLOYD S. DIXON ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR
CIVIL JUSTICE, SUPERFUND PRIVATE-SECTOR EXPENDITURES AND TRANSACTION COSTS 45
(1994)). However, CERCLA supporters point out that "RAND placed an important caveat on its
conclusions[:] the transaction cost share falls as a site moves through the remedial process." Id.
(citing RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, supra, at 45).
69. See id.
70. See Superfund Reauthorization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Superfund,
Recycling, and Solid Waste Management of the Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 103d
Cong. 180 (1993); Superfund Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Transp. and
Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Commerce, 103d Cong. (1993).
71. See Superfund Reauthorization, supra note 2, at 10214.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 10215. Many of the bills that aim to reauthorize CERCLA are extremely long
and extremely complicated, and many of the issues are controversial. See id
74. See id. Congress did pass legislation addressing the issue of lender liability under
CERCLA, an issue on which there was general consensus. See id.; see also Asset Conservation,
Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat.
3009.
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developers, and taxpayers.75 Encouraging the redevelopment of
brownfield sites especially can create jobs and economic growth in
inner cities, the areas that are most often burdened by brownfields.
76
Conversely, a failure to encourage redevelopment of brownfield sites
may lead to uncertainty about the costs and liabilities associated with
developing a given piece of property, which in turn might lead
industrial developers to seek only those properties that they know are
free of environmental problems. Such development decisions can lead
to increased urban sprawl, increased transportation costs, escalation in
the industrialization of "greenfield sites,"77 and deterioration of the
urban economic base.78
Two chief problems that discourage developers from purchasing and
developing environmentally impaired property are fear of unforeseeable
liability and lack of future profitability:
79
The problems with an environmentally impaired property
are primarily ones of uncertainty and the possibility of a lack
of profitability or ability to provide sufficient cash flow to
service its owner's and creditor's requirements. These
conditions result from both the operation of the physical facts
of the environmental problem, especially uncontained
impairment types where the physical parameters of the
problem are difficult or impossible to establish with certainty
or precision, and from the operation of law and the governing
agencies that frequently take the approach of requiring the
property owner to sign a blank check to cover an unknown cost
of remediation 80
75. See The Brownfields Phenomenon: An Analysis of Environmental, Economic, and
Community Concerns, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) No. 7, at 10337 (July 1995).
76. See id.
77. The term "greenfield sites" refers to undeveloped property. Greenfield sites are
usually located in rural or suburban areas. See General Policy: Agencywide Initiative Under
Way to Address Urban Environmental Issues, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1797 (Jan. 23,
1998)
78. See The Brownflelds Phenomenon: An Analysis of Environmental. Economic, and
Community Concerns, supra note 75, at 10338.
79. See id. at 10337.
80. Albert R. Wilson, Measuring Environmental Property Value Damages; A Discussion of
Damage Measurement andBrownfields, 4 J. ENvrL L. & PRAc. 5, 13 (1997).
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Although brownfield redevelopment increases the marketability and
economic value of properties and improves the environment,
brownfield redevelopment must not compromise the environmental
health and the well-being of local residents. Environmental justice
concerns are important because brownfields are most often found in
inner-cities and economically depressed neighborhoods.8' While the
goals of redevelopment include the creation of employment in such
areas, as well as the preservation of greenfields, such redevelopment
programs may create dual standards of environmental protection by
establishing environmental standards for cities that will remain lower
than suburban standards.82 As a result, some fear that inner-city
brownfield redevelopment will cause these areas to "ultimately become
a haven for the least desirable kinds of economic activities. 8 3
A. Administrative Efforts to Facilitate the Redevelopment of
Brownfields
The EPA first addressed the issue of brownfields in January 1995,
with its Brownfields Action Agenda.84 The Agenda addresses barriers
in existing regulations and administrative practices and attempts to
implement policy changes within the context of existing law.85 Such
changes include removing sites from the federal inventory of hazardous
waste sites, clarifying liability and cleanup issues, establishing a pilot
program, and establishing partnerships with brownfield stakeholders.8 6
In addition, three other EPA initiatives directly address concerns of
developers and lenders: the revised lender liability rule,87 prospective
81. See Georgette C. Poindexter, Separate and Unequal: A Comment on the Urban
Development Aspect of Browmfields Programs, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 11 (1996).
82. See id. at 4.
83. Id.
84. See Andrea Lee Rimer, Environmental Liability and the Brownfields Phenomenon: An
Analysis of Federal Optionsfor Redevelopment, 10 TUL ENVTL. L.J. 63, 71 (1996).
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. The EPA's revised lender liability rule was designed to clarify the ambiguities in
CERCLA's secured-creditor exanption. See id. at 86. The rule was issued following court decisions
that created confusion and uncertainty about a secured lender's potential liability as an "owner or
operator" under CERCLA. Congress recently codified the rule in the Asset Conservation, Lender
Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. See
Rimer, supra note 84, at 86. Presumably, the change was designed to "calm lender anxiety (and
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purchaser agreements (PPAs),88 and the EPA's issuance of "comfort
letters."
89
In June 1989, the EPA issued a guidance document establishing the
Agency's policy on agreements not to sue prospective purchasers of
contaminated property. 90  The guidance document specifically
acknowledges that "it is the agency's policy not to become involved in
private real estate transactions."9' The document states, however, that "a
covenant not to sue a prospective purchaser might appropriately be
considered if an enforcement action is anticipated and if performance of
or payment for cleanup would not otherwise be available except from
the Superfund, and if the prospective purchaser participates in a
cleanup. ' 92 Although the EPA rarely uses these agreements, the Clinton
Administration's 1994 proposal to amend CERCLA included a
proposal to identify bona fide prospective purchasers as a special class
of owners that would be conditionally exempt from CERCLA
liability.
93
The EPA may also issue "comfort letters" to allay prospective
brownfield purchasers' fears of potential liability for the cleanup of a
brownfield. EPA offices receive requests for comfort letters from
parties seeking assurance that the EPA will not pursue them as PRPs if
thus] make more funds available for brownfields redevelopment."
88. See Louis J. Schiffer & Jeremy D. Heep, Forests, Wetlands and the CERCLA: Three
Examples of Environmental Protection Promoting Jobs, 22 J. CORP. L. 571,595 (1997).
89. See infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
90. See Superfund Program: De Minimus Landowner Settlements, Prospective Purchaser
Settlements, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235 (1989); see also Purchaser Agreements, Supplemental Guidance
Will Ease Polluted Property Sale, Official Says, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1522 (Dec. 17,
1993) [hereinafter PurchaserAgreements] (citing EPA Issues Claim Settlement Policyfor "Innocent
Landowners" Under CERCLA, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 315 (June 9, 1989).
91. EPA Issues Claim Settlement Policy for "Innocent Landowners" under CERCLA, 20
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 315 (June 9, 1989).
92. Purchaser Agreements, supra note 90, at 1522. The guidance document sets stringent
parameters for the use of such agreements, and, in the past, EPA regions have been reluctant to enter
into such agreements, signing only a few between 1989 and 1993. See Prospective Purchaser
Agreements, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) No. 1, at 10035 (Jan. 1995) (citing Purchaser
Agreements, supra note 90, at 1522). The guidance document also includes "recommended
provisions for inclusion in any agreement, including provisions granting the United States an
irrevocable right to enter the property and the purehaser's release of any claims against the federal
government" Id.
93. Seeid.at 1O036.
94. See EPA "Comfort/Status" Letters for Brownfield Properties, 4 ENVTL. STRATEGIES
FOR REAL EST. (Warren, Gorham & Lamont, New York, N.Y.), April 1997, at 1.
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they purchase or develop on brownfield property.95 In such letters, the
EPA may provide varying degrees of comfort by explaining to a
potential purchaser the Agency's position regarding a particular piece of
property. Comfort letters range from formal legal agreements
containing a covenant that the EPA will not bring suit, to general policy
statements explaining the EPA's discretion over the enforcement of
CERCLA.97
EPA regional offices may issue comfort letters at their discretion
upon request by an interested party. The EPA has developed sample
comfort letters to help the Agency's regional offices respond to such
requests.98 The sample comfort letters are designed to apply to the
following four situations: (1) when the site in question has never been
listed on the federal inventory of hazardous waste sites; (2) when the
EPA has either removed the site in question from the federal inventory
of hazardous waste sites, or the site is located near, but not on, an
inventoried waste site; (3) when the EPA intends to take action at a site
or is currently taking action at a site; and (4) when a state environmental
agency, rather than the EPA, is coordinating the response action at the
site in question." EPA regional offices can also address situations to
which the four sample comfort letters do not apply by tailoring the
sample letters when necessary.'°°
Despite the EPA's administrative attempts to encourage the
remediation and redevelopment of brownfield sites, it is clear that
prospective purchasers and developers would derive more comfort from
statutory amendments that expressly protect them from potential
liability. Thus, such express statutory protection would better promote
the redevelopment of brownfield sites.
B. Legislative Proposals





99. See id. at 2. For an example of a sample comfort letter, see id. at 4. Samples of the
comfort letters can also be found at 60 Fed. Reg. 4624,4626-29 (1997).
100. See EPA "Comfort/Status " Letters for Brownfield Properties, supra note 94, at 1.
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brownfield remediation and redevelopment initiatives. Those proposals
that are particularly relevant to this issue include: (1) limiting liability
for purchasers and lenders; (2) providing finality and certainty to
owners and developers who purchase brownfield properties for
development; (3) considering future use of a property when determining
appropriate cleanup standards; (4) using institutional controls to monitor
and maintain environmental standards on such properties; and (5)
providing federal certification of state programs that are designed to
encourage voluntary cleanups at brownfield sites.
C. Changing CERCLA s Liability Scheme
Many of the recent legislative proposals to amend CERCLA contain
provisions that would limit joint and several liability under CERCLA
for purchasers and lenders. Although these proposals have not enjoyed
bipartisan approval in Congress, both the Democratic- and Republican-
sponsored bills introduced in the 103d and 104th Congresses contain
extremely detailed procedures for allocating liability.10! Some critics of
these proposals warn, however, that such procedures run contrary to the
overall goal of streamlining CERCLA cleanups and would substantially
delay cleanups because of the need to allocate liability according to a
complex formula before cleanups could begin.1 2
Recent CERCLA reauthorization bills also contain a number of
proposed exemptions from liability. One of the more controversial
proposed provisions would partially eliminate retroactive liability.10 3
The Oxley proposal, for example, would have required payment from
the Superfund to reimburse a liable party for half of any cleanup costs
arising out of disposal activities that occurred prior to 1987.104
Representative Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.) criticized this provision,
101. See Superfund Reauthorization, supra note 2, at 10214 (citing S. 1834, 103d Cong. § 409
(1994); H.R. 3800, 103d Cong. § 409 (1994); S. 1285, 104th Cong. § 501 (1995); H.R. 2500, 104th
Cong. § 207 (1995)). CERCLA reauthorization bills, or "reform" bills, are characterized by their
complexity. During the 104th Congress, the Smith Bill, S. 1285, 104th Cong. (1995), introduced by
Sen. Robert C. Smith (R-N.HL), was 249 pages long, and the Oxley Bill, H.R. 2500, 104th Cong.
(1995), introduced by Rep. Michael G. Oxley (R-Ohio), as originally introduced was 264 pages
long. See SuperfundReauthorization, supra note 2, at 10215-16.
102. See, e.g., SuperundReauthorization, supra note 2, at 10216.
103. See id.
104. See id. (citing H.R. 2500 § 201).
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referring to it as "the Ed McMahon Polluter's Clearinghouse
Sweepstakes."' 0 5 Representative Markey admonished that paying liable
parties for their cleanup costs would result in a windfall for many
polluters.1' 6 Other proposed exemption provisions would exempt only
particular types of sites, including "remning' 07 sites, landfills, battery
recycling facilities, and oil recycling facilities.0 8
Many commentators believe that there are good reasons to retain
CERCLA's current liability scheme. First, and perhaps most
importantly, eliminating joint and several liability could undermine
voluntary cleanup programs and current industry incentives to pro-
actively prevent environmental contamination.10 9 Second, creating new
exemptions from liability for special interests, such as those listed
above, would increase the cost to taxpayers for CERCLA cleanup
projects." 0 In addition, reducing liability for some PRPs based on the
type of activity conducted at a polluted site rejects the notion that "the
polluter should pay.""' Moreover, attempts to classify certain industries
105. Superfund Reauthorization, supra note 2, at 10215 n.226 (quoting Reform of Superfund
Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 2500 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Hazardous
Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 104th Cong. 158 (1995) [hereinafter
Hearings on HR. 2500] (statement of Rep. Edward J. Markey)). The EPA estimated that this
provision in H.R. 2500 would cost the Superfiind more than $1 billion annually. See id. (quoting
Hearings on H.R. 2500, supra, at 158) (statement of Carol M. Browner, EPA Administrator)).
106. See id.
107. The term "remining" refers to operations that mine abandoned mine lands. In 1994,
the Department of Interior estimated that there were approximately twelve thousand abandoned
coal mine sites, a large percentage of which are located in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and
Kentucky. See Proposal Would Restore Abandoned Mine Lands by Providing Industry
Incentives for Remining, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 281 (June 10, 1994). Generally, these sites
were mined and abandoned prior to the enactment of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977 (SMCRA), Pub. L. No. 95-87,91 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-
1328 (1994)). See id Remining activities at these sites are governed by the SMCRA. See id.
108. See Superfund Reauthorization, supra note 2, at 10215-16.
109. Seeid. at 10221.
110. See id.
I 1l. On March 5, 1997, at a Senate Environment and Public Works subcommittee hearing, the
head of the EPA, Carol M. Browner, made the following comments to a sponsor of a CERCLA
reform bill that would exempt co-disposal landfill generators, an-angers, and transporters from
retroactive liability for CERCLA cleanups: "[The reform bill would] impose a new system that
would actually delay cleanups, shift costs from polluters to taxpayers, reduce community
involvement, and prevent hundreds of dangerous sites from being addressed." Superfimd: Senator,
EPA Chief in Heated Exchange Over Liability Provisions of GOP Measure, Env't Rep. (BNA) No.
44, at 2237 (March 14, 1997). She said that the bill's "numerous liability exemptions and limits
basically reject the notion that polluters themselves should pay the costs of cleanup." Id.
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as exempt will most likely lead to more litigation as the criteria for
exemption is challenged and clarified.
Proposals to eliminate retroactive liability under CERCLA are also
imprudent. Such an amendment would effectively penalize those
landowners who have already resolved their CERCLA liability."
2
Correspondingly, it would reward those who, through foot-dragging,
have failed to resolve their liability."t 3 As with the proposal to eliminate
liability for certain classes of polluters, eliminating retroactive liability
would likely lead to increased litigation as PRPs argue about when
hazardous waste was disposed at a site or released into the
environment. 14 Moreover, proposals to eliminate retroactive liability
also seem contradictory to the underlying purpose of CERCLA, which
is to address the problem of abandoned hazardous waste sites, many of
which were contaminated long before Congress enacted CERCLA.
A better proposal is for Congress to clarify the bases on which the
EPA should grant liability exemptions to brownfield purchasers. Such
exemptions should release bona fide prospective purchasers of
brownfields from CERCLA liability under statutory or administrative
criteria. 15 The Clinton Administration's 1994 Superfund Reform Bill
116
contained such provisions, expressly defining a "bona fide prospective
purchaser" who would be exempt from liability under CERCLA as:
a person who acquires ownership of a facility after enactment
of this provision, and who can establish by a preponderance of
the evidence [that, inter alia, she] is not affiliated with any
other person liable for response costs at the facility, through
any direct or indirect familial relationship, or any contractual,
corporate, or financial relationship other than that created by
the instruments by which title to the facility is conveyed or
financed.'
17
112. See Superfimd Reauthorization, supra note 2, at 10221.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. The EPA has the authority to enter into such agreements but has done so only in a few
cases. See Purchaser Agreements, supra note 90, at 1522.
116. S. 1834, 103d Cong. (1994), cited in Rimer, supra note 84, at 79.
117. Id., quoted in Rimer, supra note 84, at 79. The Administration's 1994 proposed Superfund
Reform Bill also would have granted the United States the authority to place a lien on facilities
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If Congress exempts purchasers and developers from CERCLA
liability in certain circumstances in order to facilitate brownfield
redevelopment, such exemptions will increase the market value of
brownfield property. Some are concerned that this would result in a
windfall to those owners whose activity on the property contributed to
its contamination." 8 The counter-argument, however, is that permitting
prior owners to recover value from the property by selling it to
protected purchasers would provide the liable owners with funds that
they could use to pay CERCLA judgments against the property.
D. How Clean is Clean?
Defining the scope of cleanup actions at a hazardous waste site and
finalizing cleanup activities upon completion of remediation are issues
that substantially affect a prospective purchaser's interest in a
brownfield remediation project. An important issue in this debate is the
extent to which the future use of the property should be used as a
criterion in determining appropriate cleanup standards under CERCLA.
Today, the NCP requires the EPA to undertake a "site-specific
baseline risk assessment" for each cleanup site.19 The EPA uses the
risk assessment to determine the maximum safe levels of contaminants
at a site.2 ° The EPA typically uses a conservative worst-case-scenario
approach in establishing its baseline risk assessment and takes into
consideration the possibility that a cleanup site may someday be used as
residential property.' 2' The EPA's remedy selection for a particular site
rarely reflects the actual likely future use of the site.1 22 In addition,
CERCLA, as amended by SARA, expresses a strong preference for
permanent remedies at a site.123
owned by bona fide prospective purchasers for any unrecovered response costs that increased a
property's value. See Prospective Purchaser Agreements, supra note 92, at 10039.
118. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
119. See Rimer, supra note 84, at 88-89 (citing 55 Fed. Reg. 8848 (1990)).
120. See id. (citing Douglas A. McWilliams, Environmental Justice and Industrial
Redevelopment: Economics and Equality in Urban Revitalization, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 705, 739
(1994)).
121. Seeid.at89.
122. Seeid at 89-90.
123. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 279. This preference for
permanent remedies at a site "embodies the idea that PRPs and the EPA should be able to walk
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Those who advocate that the EPA should consider future land use as
a factor in response selection argue that some sites will pose greater
environmental risks than others because of the use to which they are
put.' 24 Advocates for future land use consideration argue that when the
EPA creates remediation goals, the Agency should set permissible
contaminant levels for industrial-use property higher than permissible
contaminant levels for residential-use property.125 This would result in a
potentially significant decrease in remediation costs without a
significant increase in risk to human health. 126 Others argue that
determining appropriate remediation for a site should also include
consideration of the site's background contamination level. 127 Such
consideration would help to ensure that remediation objectives do not
require the attainment of contamination levels that are lower than an
area's background contamination level.' 28 This prevents the creation of
a "hole in the donuft--land that is temporarily cleaner than the
contaminated soil and groundwater that surround it.'29 If a site is
cleaned while the surrounding land and groundwater are left
contaminated, the cleaned site is likely to revert to a level of
contamination "representing the average [contamination level] of the
surrounding area."
30
On the other hand, some question whether consideration of future
land use will actually decrease the cost and predictability of remediation
efforts.' 3' Because future use of brownfields will often occur in areas
surrounded by urban neighborhoods, 132 there is concern that lowering
brownfield cleanup standards will ultimately affect the health and
environment of those who reside in the vicinity of such sites.'33 There is
away from the site after a cleanup without worrying about future danger to the public and the
environment." Rimer, supra note 84, at 90.
124. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 80, at 11.
125. See id. This division of contaminant levels is part of Illinois's Environmental
Protection Act, 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/1 to 5/58.12 (West 1996).





131. See Rimer, supra note 84, at 93-94.
132. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
133. See Rimer, supra note 84, at 94.
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additional concern that industrial use of redeveloped property could
lead to workers' occupational exposure to contaminants at a site.
134
There is a legitimate question as to the wisdom of a policy that could
consign properties to permanent industrial use based on less demanding
cleanup standards, especially in inner-city urban areas.135 Despite these
concerns, some recent legislative proposals would significantly lower
CERCLA's cleanup standards. 13 , Some of the proposed changes
include: eliminating the current preference for permanent treatment
remedies, placing containment remedies on an equal footing with
treatment remedies, changing the level of exposure to hazardous
substances that would constitute a human health risk, providing
alternative methods of compensating for or eliminating groundwater
contamination, and elevating the role that cost-effectiveness plays in
remedy selection.
37
Proposals to lower cleanup standards under CERCLA will likely
prove controversial; however, most agree that Congress should amend
CERCLA to expedite the remediation process and permit the EPA more
flexibility in setting cleanup standards. 138 One proposal that has
received general support would require the EPA to set national
standards for soil and groundwater contamination for the approximately
one hundred hazardous substances most commonly found at Superfund
sites. 139 This proposal also recommends that Congress should provide
the EPA with some measure of flexibility to waive the standards when
appropriate. 140 Providing such flexibility would help expedite the risk
134. See id.
135. Ironically, the Love Canal property was used for the disposal of some twenty-two
thousand tons of chemical waste between 1942 and 1953, and yet eventually was occupied by a
residential neighborhood and school. See SuperjundReauthorization, supra note 2, at 10224.
136. See id. at 10216-17. This is especially true for the Smith and Oxley Bills. See id
137. See id.at 10217.
138. According to recent reports covering fiscal years 1992-1994, the EPA has streamlined
cleanups. See generally Superfund: Agency Increased Efforts to Streamline Cleanups. Aid
Communities Reports Say. Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 18 (Aug. 29, 1997). The Superfund Accelerated
Cleanup Model was introduced in fiscal year 1992 to streamline the cleanup process and has
successfully eliminated the overlap between the types of cleanup actions in removal and remedial
programs. In addition, the EPA has created a Superfund Revitalization Office and National
Superfund Risk Management Workgroup to improve the efficiency of cleanups and to promote
innovative treatment technologies. See generally id.
139. See Superfund Reauthorization, supra note 2, at 10223.
140. See id.
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assessment and remedy selection processes at Superfund sites.
Providing flexibility, however, is different than reducing the overall
health and safety standards imposed by law. While the EPA should be
permitted to consider future land use as a factor in selecting an
appropriate remedy for a site, future land use should not be
determinative of appropriate standards for remediation.14'
E. Finality
Another cleanup issue that has been the focus of recent proposals is
the attempt to increase the finality of the cleanup process.1
42
Presumably, a brownfield purchaser and developer will want to enter
into a binding agreement with appropriate federal and state
environmental agencies assuring that they will not be subject to liability
upon completion of a remediation project. Such agreements, if they
contain provisions limiting future use of the remedied property, provide
protection to the owner. However, by limiting future use, such
agreements also limit the marketability of the property.143 Policy makers
in the CERCLA reauthorization debate must decide the extent to which
cleanup standards should be relaxed to encourage the present
redevelopment of brownfields, especially when such relaxation may
limit the future use and marketability of property.
Despite concerns about limiting future use, there is general
agreement that some degree of finality is important to resolving
purchasers' uncertainty about investing in brownfield property.' 4 Some
states, such as Illinois, have addressed the issue of finality by providing
"No Further Remediation Letters" ("NFR Letters"). 45 The state will
issue an NFR Letter to a brownfield purchaser or other applicable
PRP 146 after the agency approves a report certifying that all remedial
141. See id. at 10224. CERCLA does not expressly provide for consideration of future use;
however, the EPA has construed its authority to permit such consideration. See id. (citing NCP
Preamble, 55 Fed. Reg. 8666,8710 (1990)).
142. See, e.g., Rimer, supra note 84, at 95-97.
143. See Wilson, supra note 80, at 11.
144. See generally Rimer, supra note 84, at 95-97 (discussing the pros and cons of
finality).
145. 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/58.10(a) (West 1996).
146. See id. § 5/58.10(d).
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action for a site is complete. 147 This letter, issued by the governing
agency, is recorded as part of the title to the property and "[is]
considered prima facie evidence that the site does not constitute a threat
to human health and the environment and does not require further
remediation under [the] Act, so long as the site is utilized in accordance
with the terms of the [letter]." 14
The NFR Letter, under the Illinois scheme, extends to "successor[s]-
in-interest of the owner of the site."'149 As a result, successor owners are
protected from further remediation requirements and have assurance
that the site is safe for its listed intended use.150 Unfortunately, many
states lack voluntary cleanup programs authorizing agencies to grant
such covenants not to sue or similar certificates of release. Furthermore,
federal law provides no protection for successor owners should the EPA
or a third party choose to file a CERCLA cost recovery action. 15' For
this reason, federal PPAs and comfort letters remain an essential part of
putting together a brownfield remediation and redevelopment project.
F. State Voluntary Cleanup Programs
CERCLA should be amended to authorize federal certification of
state voluntary compliance programs to encourage the remediation of
brownfield sites. As originally conceived, CERCLA lacks the element
of cooperative federalism illustrated by partnerships between the federal
government and state governments under other environmental laws
such as the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act.' 52 Perhaps
Congress assumed that the EPA would develop cleanup expertise and
147. See!. § 5/58.10(b).
148. Id. §5/58.10(a).
149. Id. § 5/58.10(dX7).
150. See Wilson, supra note 80, at 11. If the governing agency wants to reopen the matter, it
must prove that an NFR Letter was obtained as a result of incorrect or fraudulent information. See
id. violating the terms of an NFR Letter will render the letter voidable. See § 5/58.10(e).
151. But cf supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text (discussing federal liability
exemptions).
152. See Robert H. Abrams, Superfund and the Evohution of Brownfields, 21 WM. & MARY
ENVrT. L. & POL'Y REv. 265 (1997). For example, under the Clean Air Act, the EPA sets national
ambient quality standards, and the states implement those standards through state implementation
plans. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994). Under the Clean Water Act, states have
authority to administer the NPDES permit program if authorized by the EPA to do so. See Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
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use such expertise in subsequent cleanup actions in a way that states
could not duplicate.' 53 Alternatively, Congress may have believed that
the number of Superfund sites would be relatively few but sufficiently
complex and severe so as to require the vast resources of the federal
government.' 5 4 In either event, there are good reasons for Congress now
to authorize state programs to facilitate cleanup at hazardous waste sites
that are not currently under CERCLA cleanup orders.
First, states are better able to evaluate their own needs and
limitations because of their ability to take into account local social,
political, geographical, and economic considerations.' Such
considerations undoubtedly will differ from state to state. '56 States are
also more aware of problems posed by potential sites within their
jurisdiction. Giving states the authority to develop such programs would
encourage innovation and experimentation in the redevelopment of such
areas.
Some worry that states might be more willing than the federal
government to emphasize economic considerations over environmental,
health, and safety concerns. 1 7 The empirical evidence, however, has
not shown this to be true in those states that have enacted programs
similar to CERCLA.158 Furthermore, most brownfields are not likely to
be so contaminated as to fall within CERCLA's concerns, in part
because many urban industries have avoided large-scale on-site
dumping. 59 In addition, the most seriously contaminated hazardous
waste sites already have been identified and placed on the NPL.
Consequently, most sites not already listed on the NPL involve only
small-scale spills and leaks. 6°
In November 1996, the EPA issued a guidance document
encouraging regional officials to expand partnerships with state
voluntary cleanup programs. 161 According to the guidance document,
153. See Abrams, supra note 152, at 267.
154. See id.
155. See Rimer, supra note 84, at 106.
156. See id.
157. See, e.g., id. at 107.
158. See id. at 106.
159. See Abrams, supra note 152, at 274-75. This aversion to on-site dumping was augmented
by state nuisance laws, which also impeded large-scale contamination of urban sites. See id.
160. See id
161. See Memorandum from the EPA to Superfund National Policy Managers, Interim
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the EPA will use six baseline criteria to review a state program to
determine whether it:
(1) provides opportunities for meaningful community
involvement, (2) ensures that voluntary response actions are
protective of human health and the environment, (3) has
adequate resources to ensure timeliness of voluntary response
actions and availability of technical assistance, (4) provides
mechanisms for the written approval of response action plans
and documentation that the response actions are complete, (5)
provides adequate oversight to ensure that the response actions
protect human health and the environment, and (6) shows the
capability of ensuring completion of response actions if the
volunteering parties fail to complete the response actions
1 62
Based on these criteria, EPA regional offices negotiate "memoranda
of agreement" (MOA) with interested states.163 These MOA
determine how cleanup responsibilities will be divided between a
state and the EPA.164 The EPA has made clear, however, that "[the
EPA] does not intend that these MOAs constitute no-action
assurances for any specific site."' 65 In reauthorizing CERCLA,
Congress should amend CERCLA to give qualified states maximum
flexibility to implement cleanup programs. Delegation of authority
should be based on criteria demonstrating a state's qualifications for
overseeing cleanups and should include the authority to authorize,
approve, and finalize brownfield remediation projects.
G. The Role ofLocal Governments
Local governments are often in a better position to encourage the
Approaches for Regional Relations with State Voluntary Cleanup Programs (Nov. 14, 1996)
[hereinafter Memorandum to Policy Managers]. Since issuing the Memorandum to Policy
Managers, the EPA has issued a revised guidance document. See A Notice of Availability of
Final Draft Guidance for Developing CERCLA Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) Language
Concerning State Voluntary Cleanup Programs, 62 Fed. Reg. 47495 (1997).
162. Voluntary Cleanup Guidance Supports Goals on Brownfields EPA Says in Answer to
Questions, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 2005 (Jan. 31, 1997).
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. Id. (quoting Memorandum to Policy Managers, supra note 161).
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redevelopment of brownfields than either the federal or state
governments. First, a local government can identify best the sites within
its community that may be appropriate for redevelopment. Regulating
local land use is a primary function of local governments, and local
planning and zoning departments presumably know the areas that are
used for heavy industrial activities. Second, land use planning is a
function of local government. Under their police power, local
governments routinely issue building permits and certificates of
occupancy, designate areas for tax abatement and redevelopment funds,
and grant variances and conditional use permits for industrial and
manufacturing activities. 1
66
While it is clear that local governments must act consistently with
state and federal mandates, state governments should give more
authority to local governments to review and approve brownfield
redevelopment proposals. Local communities should be involved
directly in the challenge of reconciling potential conflicts between
economic goals and health concerns within their communities. Local
governments are also in the best position to coordinate federal, state,
and county funding that may be available to assist brownfield
restoration projects. 167
H. Institutional Controls
Future owners of redeveloped brownfields must use the sites in a
manner that is consistent with the EPA's designated uses of the
property. One suggestion for ensuring compliance with future use
requirements is to incorporate existing institutional controls into the list
of cleanup project requirements. 168 Existing institutional controls
include restrictive covenants, negative easements, and reversionary
interests.
The restrictive covenant is a deed restriction that prohibits specific
166. See, e.g., Ben Boer, Institutionalizing Ecologically Sustainable Development: The
Roles of National, State and Local Governments in Translating Grand Strategy into Action, 31
WILLAMETTE L. REv. 307,355-56 (1995).
167. See Conference Explores Factors to Consider in Remediation, Redevelopment of
Brownfields, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1423 (Nov. 1, 1996).
168. See Rimer, supra note 84, at 98-99.
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uses of a particular piece of land. 69 To provide notice of the use
restriction to future owners, the restriction is recorded with the title
documents under state law recording schemes. Because restrictive
covenants "run with the land," 170 they would be an effective means of
preventing the unwanted use of remedied brownfield property,
notwithstanding repeated transfers of ownership in such property. A
negative easement granted to the EPA as part of a consent decree would
also provide the EPA with a method for enforcing use restrictions in the
future. Such provisions would allow the EPA or a local granting agency
to prohibit specific activities on the land that might otherwise be
permissible.
171
Creating a reversionary interest in deed is a third method by which
governments could restrict the future use of a property. A reversionary
interest is a term included in the property conveyance that sets forth
certain mandatory conditions with which the purchaser must comply in
using the property. Upon the violation of a condition, the property
reverts to the grantor. 172 Because a reversionary interest must be
included in a deed at the time of sale, this method of land use control
would be appropriate only for cases in which the government conveys
an interest in property.
173
There are some problems with using existing institutional controls to
limit the future use of a property. First, these mechanisms essentially are
creatures of state law and are not always interpreted or applied
consistently by the states.'74 Second, utilizing these institutional controls
to ensure compliance would require continuous monitoring by the EPA
or appropriate state agencies. The right to enforce a reversionary
interest, for example, may be lost if the party holding the reversion does
not act promptly when the condition is broken. 7 5 Furthermore, placing
too many restrictions on use may create a disincentive for prospective
169. See id. at 98.
170. Id. According to Rimer, a covenant will "run with the land" ifa number of conditions
are met, "including that the owners have actual or constructive notice, and that vertical and
horizontal privity of estate exist." Id.
171. Seeid. at98-99.
172. See id. at 99.
173. See id
174. See id. at 100.
175. See Frona Powell, Defeasible Fees and the Nature of Real Property, 40 U. KAN. L. REV.
411,415-16(1992).
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purchasers to undertake development projects, thereby decreasing the
future marketability of certain properties.
I. Incentives for Development
Previous discussion has focused on the need to address problems of
potential liability and the enforcement of cleanup standards in order to
provide more certainty for prospective purchasers of brownfields. In
addition to these issues, a major disincentive to investment in
brownfield property is the high cost of conducting the necessary site
investigation and remediation. 76 Offering positive financial incentives
to parties who undertake the redevelopment of contaminated brownfield
sites is a frequently proposed method for encouraging developers to
undertake such projects. 1"
Financial incentives take a variety of forms, including grants, loans,
and tax credits. One source of such incentives, the EPA's Brownfields
Economic Redevelopment Initiative, provides loans to states, local
governments, and other local entities that have demonstrated the desire
and capability to coordinate efforts to clean up and redevelop
brownfields. 171 As of May 1997, the EPA had funded seventy-eight
brownfield assessment demonstration pilots, each funded up to
$200,000 over two years. 179
Recent federal legislative proposals to encourage brownfield
remediation and redevelopment also contain financial incentives for
developers. The proposed Brownfields Redevelopment Act of 1997,180
176. See Rimer, supra note 84, at 110. Such costs can often run into the millions of dollars. See
id
177. See id
178. See Proposed Guidelines Announced by EPA for Brownfields Revolving Loan Fund
Pilots, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 50-51 (May 9, 1997). The EPA's Revolving Loan Fund was
awarded to state and local entities "to test brownfields cleanup revolving loan fund models that
direct special efforts toward facilitating coordinated public and private efforts at the federal, state
and local levels." Id. at 51. Eligible parties were required to "demonstrate an ability to manage a
revolving loan fund and environmental cleanups; a need for cleanup funds; commitment to creative
leveraging of EPA funds with public-private partnerships and in-kind services, and a clear plan for
sustaining the environmental protection and related economic development activities initiated
through [the] program." Id. The application deadline for participation in the program was June 9,
1997. See id. at 50.
179. Seek
180. H.R. 523, 105th Cong. (1997).
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for example, would provide $2 billion in tax incentives for cleaning up
abandoned and contaminated industrial sites.181 The bill proposes a
credit of up to fifty percent of the costs incurred by a party in cleaning
up a brownfield site.182 It further proposes making available tax-exempt
bonds to help finance such cleanups. 83 A very similar bill was recently
introduced in the Senate.' 84 The Senate bill was co-sponsored by Senate




As of May 1997, ten bills to revitalize former industrial or
commercial areas known as brownfields had been introduced in the
105th Congress. 186 While legislators appear divided largely along party
lines over the question of whether to adopt stand-alone legislation
addressing the cleanup of brownfields,' 87 the fact that one proposal has
garnered more than fifty co-sponsors indicates that there is widespread
support for brownfield legislation in Congress.
88
There is a general consensus that initiatives to revitalize abandoned,
idle, or under-used industrial and commercial sites should be
encouraged, and that a major obstacle to the redevelopment of these
sites is environmental contamination. Prospective purchasers and
developers of these sites are uncertain and fearful of potential liability
under CERCLA, and banks are often reluctant to issue loans because of
a general fear that the cleanup costs may exceed the value of the
property.
In recent years, many states have developed voluntary cleanup
181. See Superfind: House Democrat's Brownfields Measure Would Provide Credit Tax-
Exempt Bonds, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 2070 (Feb. 14, 1997).
182. See a
183. See id.
184. See id at 2071 (citing S. 235, 105th Cong. (1997)). Senate Bill 235 was introduced by
Sen. Carol Mosely-Braun (D-Ill.) on Jan. 30, 1997. See id
185. See id
186. See Division Remains on Brownfields Bill, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 50 (May 9,
1997).
187. Democrats have called for legislation that exclusively addresses brownfields, but
Republicans appear to be opposed to such legislation. According to one GOP staff member, other
parts of CERCLA need to be changed as well. See id
188. See id.
Washington University Open Scholarship
142 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 53:113
programs that entail agreements designed to provide liability protection
to private parties. The EPA should be encouraged to enter into similar
binding agreements with prospective brownfield purchasers under
appropriate guidelines as a part of state voluntary cleanup programs.
Congress should amend CERCLA to clarify the circumstances under
which such agreements are appropriate.
Congress, however, should avoid the temptation to make major
changes in CERCLA's current liability scheme. Eliminating joint and
several liability and retroactive liability for particular parties or
industries under complicated legislative schemes would eliminate
strong incentives to clean up contaminated property and to avoid
contamination in the future. It would cost taxpayers a great deal of
money and would likely result in increased litigation. Present provisions
in CERCLA, such as the "de minimis" provisions in SARA, provide
sufficient means to protect PRPs that have contributed minimal
hazardous waste to a site.
Congress should give the EPA more flexibility to set cleanup
standards that are appropriate for a specific site. 190 While this flexibility
should allow the EPA to consider a site's future use, overall health and
safety standards should remain high regardless of a site's future use.
Institutional controls, such as land and water use restrictions and
limitations on future land use, should be used when appropriate and on
a site-specific basis.
Finally, qualified states should be authorized to implement the
CERCLA cleanup program. 191 States should be given flexibility to
undertake implementation on either a state-wide or site-selection basis.
As a part of state participation in the program, local governments should
have the authority to participate in and approve local brownfield
redevelopment projects. In addition, federal and state financial
incentives should continue to be used to encourage such projects.
Taking these steps will improve CERCLA-a statute that, despite its
flaws, has been successful in cleaning up hazardous waste sites
throughout the nation-and will encourage the redevelopment and
remediation of brownfield sites throughout the United States.
189. See Superfund Reauthorization, supra note 2, at 10221-22.
190. See id. at 10223-25.
191. See id. at 10225.
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